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Terminally Nosy: Are Employers Free To
Access Our Electronic Mail?
I.

Introduction

The technological advances in the electronic communications
field within the last decade continue to generate much debate regarding the privacy of an individual's communications. Technology
allows individuals to pry into another's personal affairs without fear
of discovery. Specifically, technology makes monitoring in the workplace easier and more prevalent. Employers utilize devices that tape
and record the actions and movements of employees.' With this new
technology, employers are now better equipped to monitor employee
conversations without ever being detected. 2
Monitoring employee conversations is not a new concept. Employers have engaged in such practices for decades.' In most instances, the law allows visual and telephonic monitoring. 4 This new
technology has created new methods of employee communication.
For example, the electronic mail communication system, otherwise
known as E-Mail, is a new method of communicating among individ1. See generally Kurt H. Decker, Employment Privacy Law for the 1990's, 15 PEPP. L.
REV. 551 (1988) (discussing employment privacy in the context of employers' collecting, reading, and disclosing data on employees).
2. John P. Furfaro and Maury B. Josephson, Electronic Monitoring of Employees: Part
II, 204 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1990, at 4 [hereinafter Electronic Monitoring: Part I1] (discussing
privacy implications when employer uses electronic monitoring in the workplace).
3. "Stories of Mistrust and Manipulation: The Electronic Monitoring of the American
Workforce," 9 to 5, Working Women Educational Fund, Feb. 1990, at I [hereinafter 9 to 5
Report]. The report illustrates the human costs, abuses of computer monitoring, and monitoring in the workplace. The report focuses on real stories told by employees and suggests possible
ways to limit such monitoring. (Copy on file with the Dickinson Law Review).
4. See generally IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD ET AL., WORKPLACE PRIVACY: EMPLOYEE
TESTING.

SURVEILLANCE, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE,

AND OTHER AREAS OF VULNERABILITY

205-19 (2d ed. 1989) (focusing on privacy rights in employer monitoring and investigation
practices of employees and suggesting possible workplace search guidelines that employers can
follow in order to respect workers' privacy interests); Gary T. Marx and Sanford Sherizen,
Monitoring on the Job: How To Protect Privacy As Well As Property, 89 TECH. REV. 63, 66
(1986) (recognizing that monitoring practices are allowed and discussing the privacy implications of monitoring in the workplace in light of the new technological age); Peter A. Susser,
Electronic Monitoring in the Private Sector: How Closely Should Employers Supervise Their
Workers?, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 575 (1988) (recognizing that employers are allowed to
monitor, but suggesting that out of fairness to the employee, employers should implement
practices that protect employee privacy interests and limit the level of intrusion caused by
monitoring practices); Lisa Brunn, Comment, Privacy and the Employment Relationship, 25
Hous. L. REV. 389 (1988) (discussing the protection of privacy in the employer/employee
context with respect to monitoring practices and analyzing constitutional and common law
privacy rights with particular emphasis on Texas privacy law).
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uals. E-Mail dominates communication among businesses and within
the corporate structure. Approximately nine million Americans now
send an estimated one and one half billion messages annually via
computer. 5 Polls indicate an expected increase in this number in the
next ten years. 6
With the advent of such technological advancements, new legal
questions concerning an individual's right to privacy arise. The question becomes: Is there a right to privacy - statutory, constitutional,
or common law - that protects electronic mail communications?
More specifically, does the employer invade an employee's protected
privacy interest by monitoring employee messages sent via computer
to other employees or businesses?
This Comment discusses whether both public and private employees have a right to privacy regarding their E-Mail, how far this
right extends, and whether any limitations exist on employer monitoring of employees' electronic mail. Section II discusses the
mechanics of an electronic mail network system and the different
types available to the public. Section III of the Comment discusses
the protection offered by the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act and the flaws in the Act that result in only limited protection.
Section IV discusses the constitutional right to privacy in the public
employment context, and Section V discusses the common law right
to privacy in the private employment context. ]Finally, Section VI
proposes a remedy for the future in light of the limited protection
offered to the employee.
II.

The Anatomy of an Electronic Mail Network System

In an electronic mail network system, individuals transmit
messages to each other via terminal lines and routing mechanisms
contained in a central computer.' The equipment necessary to access
the system is: a modem, 8 a computer, and the necessary software. 9 A
5.

Michael Stroud, Rise of Electronic Mail Raises Sticky Privacy Issues, INVESTOR'S

DAILY, June 22, 1990, at 13.

6. Id.
7. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 541]. This
Congressional report discusses the reasons for amending Title III of the Omnibus Crimes and
Control Act to include electronic communications such as electronic mail. The report also
discusses other areas covered by the Act and includes amended sections of the Act. Id.
8. A "modem is a device which allows computers to transmit and receive data." Laura
L. Cluckey, Comment, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: The Impact on
Software Communication Technologies, 2 SOFTWARE L.J. 243, 252 n.58 (1988) (citing Soma
et al., Legal Analysis of Electronic Bulletin Board Activities, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 571,
572 n.l (1985)). This Comment examines the reasons why Congress enacted the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, analyzes several sections of the Act in light of the new technol-
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sender types messages into a computer terminal and transmits the
messages to an intended recipient via telephone lines, owned and operated by an electronic mail company. 10 The computer service company stores the messages in a computer mailbox. The recipient, who
subscribes to the same service, can call in to the system and retrieve
his personal, computer-mail messages." Each user receives a password in order to access the system.' 2 In the public network systems

such as MCI-Mail, Sprint-Mail, and AT&T-Mail, the password prevents unauthorized individuals from accessing a user's files.' 3 Thus,
the password allows one to use the system and also acts as a security
device. 4

In a corporate system, which is the main topic of this Comment,
the system is completely private. A private line exists between two

points with no connection to a public telephone system.' In this system, the business handles all computer calls within the company and
considers such calls its exclusive property.' 6 There are several secur-

ity devices that users within a company can employ to insure privacy. These devices include passwords, frequent changing of pass-

7
words, encripting passwords, and multiple-level password entry.1

While these security devices operate to secure against unwarranted
ogy, and demonstrates the potential function of the Act. See generally id.; see also American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., The Ability To Share Information Around The Corner. Around
The World: AT&T Mail I, 2 (1988) (brochure distributed by AT&T to potential customers
regarding AT&T E-Mail).
9. Interview with Joyce Skarlatos, Director of Computer Services at The Dickinson
School of Law, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (Sept. 14, 1990) [hereinafter Interview]. The necessary
software will vary according to the type of network system to which an individual subscribes,
such as AT&T-Mail, Sprint-Mail, MCI-Mail, or Bitnet. Id.
10. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 8.
I1. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 8. If the recipient is not a member, the computer
service company providing the service will type the message onto paper and send it to the
intended recipient via the Federal Mail System. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 8.
12. Interview, supra note 9. See generally Loh-Ping Yu, The Anatomy of a Distributed
Mail Network, 14 DATA COMM. 153 (1985) (discussing the advantages of a distributed electronic mail network system and explaining the technical architecture of a distributed electronic
mail network).
13. Interview, supra note 9. Occasionally, hackers are able to break into the electronic
mail system. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, however, offers protection against
these individuals. See infra notes 20-40 and accompanying text. "Hackers are individuals,
skilled in computer technology, interested in testing their knowledge of computers against computer system capabilities." Cluckey, supra note 8, at 250 n.58.
14. Interview, supra note 9.
15. Ruel Torres Hernandez, ECPA and Online Computer Privacy, 41 FED. COMM. L.J.
17, 22 (1988) (examining the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and the extent
of the protection it offers regarding privacy of electronic communications).
16. Id.
17. Interview, supra note 9. "Encripting" a password is encoding the word in the form
of numbers or letters so that no word or term is readily recognizable as a name. Different
entry levels result when a password leads to another password. Interview, supra note 9.
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invasion by other employees and crackers,18 they do not prevent the
employer from gaining access into an employee's files. Because employers provide the system, such systems generally do not have the
security features that a public mail network system contains.19 Employers must know the intricacies of the system in order to rectify
any system failure or program problems. Because of this knowledge,
at any given time, employers can "call up" all messages stored in the
system without needing the employees' passwords. Thus, the internal

mechanics of the system do not provide the employee with privacy
protection from employers.
III. Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Right to Privacy of Electronic Communications
In light of the dramatic changes in technology and the increase
in the number of individuals using electronic communications, 20 individuals are concerned with protection of their private communications. In 1986, Congress amended Title III of the Omnibus Crimes

Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 by enacting the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). 21 The Act protects individu-

als using electronic mail network systems from unauthorized interception, use, or access by other persons. 22 The Act does not, however,
offer protection from employers who access stored communication
files. 23 Furthermore, there are exceptions to the protection offered by
18. "Crackers" are individuals who criminally attempt to "crack into computer networks
for illegal access." Hernandez, supra note 15, at 32 n.60.
19. Interview, supra note 9. Usually, a system that the prov:,der/employer chooses is one
that will enable the employer to access all files within the system. Interview, supra note 9.
20. An "electronic communication" is:
any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, 'electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce but does not include:
a) the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit;
b) any wire or oral communication;
c) any communication made through a tone-only paging device; or
d) any communication from a tracking device.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1988).
21. Prior to the adoption of ECPA, the wiretapping statute was limited to audio transmissions by wire or cable. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1982). A "wire communication" is:
any [communication] made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for
the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, . . . or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception . . . furnished
or operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate and foreign communications.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(I) (1988).
22. See infra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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ECPA, 4 making ECPA inapplicable as a device for protecting intracompany electronic communications. This section discusses the extent of ECPA coverage, limitations on the protection offered by the
Act, and exceptions under the Act.
A.

Types of Communications Covered Under The Act

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act protects employees
against an unauthorized use of authority by another individual (most
typically other employees).2 5 Under ECPA it is against the law for
an individual to "intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral or
electronic communication." 2 6 ECPA creates privacy protections for
new computer and telecommunication technologies such as electronic
mail, 2 7 computer-to-computer communications,2 8 electronic bulletin
boards,29 cellular telephones, a" and digitized transmissions."1 ECPA
protection, therefore, applies to electronic transmissions found in
most electronic communication systems.32 This protection covers intentional actions to intercept communications by unauthorized individuals, hackers," crackers,34 and individuals acting on behalf of the
government.3 5 Thus, the Act gives protection in a situation where an
employee or outside individual exceeds his authority when accessing,
intercepting, or disclosing information on a private corporate
24. See infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text..
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2711 (1988).
26. 18 US.C § 2511(i)(a) (1988).
27. See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
28. Computer-to-computer communications include "the transmission of financial
records or funds transfers among financial institutions, medical records between hospital and/
or physicians' offices, and the transmission of proprietary data among the various offices of a
company." S. REP. No.541, supra note 7, at 8.
29. Electronic Bulletin Boards (BBS's) are "communications networks created by computer users for the transfer of information among computers." S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7,
at 8-9. BBS's are part of a larger network called hobbiest systems that are predominantly used
by recreational computer users. Hernandez, supra note 15, at 19-20. These systems may be
proprietary in nature or may be non-commercial systems operating among users with common
special interests. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 9.
30. Cellular phones are a combination of radio and wire transmissions that operate
through a system of sending signals over the air on a frequency to a cell site that is equipped
to receive and radiate messages within its parameters. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 9.
31. Digitized transmissions include pen registers and electronic tracking devices. S. REP.
No. 541, supra note 7, at 10.
32. Cluckey, supra note 8, at 250.
33. See supra note 13.
34. See supra note 18.
35. 18 U.SC. § 2511(1)(a), (2)(a)(ii) (1988). A government agent must have a court
order, signed by a judge who has authority to direct such interception, directing the provider of
the service to assist and intercept. Id. An exception to this requirement exists if the agent
obtains "a certification in writing by a person specified in § 2518(7) of Title III or by the
Attorney General of the United States, that no warrant or court order is required by law, that
all statutory requirements have been met and that specified assistance is required." Id.
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system.36

ECPA also protects electronic communications, such as E-Mail,
that are stored in the computer system for later retrieval.37 ECPA
prohibits breaking into an electronic storage system by anyone who
would intentionally access the system without authorization or intentionally exceed authorized access into the system."' Similarly, ECPA
also prevents law enforcement agents from invading an electronic
storage system such as E-Mail without a court order, except in the
case of exigent circumstances. 39 Thus, any interception or disclosure

of electronic communications or any entry into an electronic system
to alter or obtain stored communications violates the statute. Any
right to privacy
such invasions into E-Mail violate an individual's
4
and give rise to both criminal and civil liability. 1
B.

Limitations of Coverage Under ECPA

ECPA makes a distinction between public and private communication systems. ECPA does not protect electronic communications
that are readily accessible to the public. Conversely, the statute
does protect a system, such as E-Mail, containing private communi-

cations."2 This protection, however, has limitations in both the private and public employment context.
The legislative history of ECPA indicates that Congress in-

tended the Act to cover private corporate communication systems.

3

36. See Hernandez, supra note 15, at 38; see also S. REP. No 541, supra note 7, at 36.
37. "Electronic Storage" is defined as: "A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a
wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and B) any
storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup
protection of such communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1988).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1988). An example of an individual exceeding authority is
when an employer authorizes the individual to access information found in his or her portion of
the system and that individual accesses information belonging to other subscribers without the
requisite authorization. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 36.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1988). Delayed notice is acceptable or not required where extreme exigent circumstances exist. ECPA lists several exigent circumstances: I) endangering
the life or physical safety of an individual; 2) flight from prosecution; 3) destructing or tampering with evidence; 4) intimidation of a potential witness. 18 U.S.C § 2705 (1988).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4), (5) (1988).
41. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 18, 36. The Act does not cover communications
readily accessible to the public such as: I) public electronic bulletin board systems in which
access does not require any special access code or warning to indicate that the information is
private; 2) subcarrier and UBI communications transmitted for the general public and; 3)
radio communications transmitted for the general public or those that relate to ships, aircraft
vehicles or persons in distress. S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 18-19, 36.
42. Hernandez, supra note 15, at 31; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(i) (1988).
43. The Senate Report contains the following statement of intended application to indicate that Congress intended both public accessible communication systems, such as AT&T
Mail, and private corporate systems to be treated on an equal bas'.s:
Today we have large-scale electronic mail operations, computer-to-computer
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However, a loophole exists that enables employers to intercept, monitor, and read employees' electronic mail without suffering criminal
or civil liability."
Under ECPA an officer, agent, or employee of a provider of a
service may intercept a communication without suffering liability as
long as the activity is necessary to provide services or to protect
property."' In the context of wiretapping and extension telephone
monitoring, Title III of the Omnibus Crimes and Control Act also
provides two implied exceptions to liability for intercepting an individual's communications."' The extension telephone exception falls
under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) that defines intercept.47 Under this section, interception of a communication is by an "electronic, mechani'
cal, or other device." 48
An extension phone is not an intercepting
device within the meaning of the statute."' The second implied exception, "inthe ordinary course of business," is set forth in the definition of an "electronic, mechanical or other device." ' 50 While an emdata transmissions, cellular and cordless telephones, paging devices and video
teleconferencing. A phone call can be carried by wire, by microwave or fiber
optics. It can be transmitted in the form of digitized voice, data or video. Since
the divestiture of AT&T and deregulation, many different companies, not just
common carriers, offer a wide variety of telephone and other communication
services. It does not make sense that a phone call transmitted via common carrier is protected by the current federal wiretap statute, while the same phone
call transmitted via a private telephone network such as those used by many
major U.S. corporations today, would not be covered by the statute.
S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 2-3 (footnote omitted). Congress, in defining § 2510(l)
further stated, "This language recognizes that private networks and intra-company communications systems are common today and brings them within the protection of the statute." S.
REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 12.
44. See infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
45. 18 U.S.C § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1988). ECPA expanded exemptions to cover an officer,
agent or employee of a provider of:
wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose or use that communication
in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is
necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights
or property of the provider of that service.
Id.
46. Section 2510(4) applies to the extension telephone exception. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)
(1988). Section 2510(5)(a) impliedly sets forth the "ordinary course of business" exception. 18
U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1988). See also S. REP. No. 541, supra note 7, at 13, 20.
47. Intercept means "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1988).
48. Id.
49. Martha W. Barnett and Scott D. Makar, In the Ordinary Course of Business: The
Legal Limits of Wiretapping, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 715, 726 (1988) (discussing
federal and state laws that limit the extent that an employer may monitor employee activity
with special emphasis on the extension telephone and "ordinary course of business" exception
as well as Florida state law).
50. "[Ellectronic, mechanical, or other device" means:
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ployee has a legitimate expectation of privacy,6 1 it appears from the
language of the statute that an employer may monitor telephone
calls under Title III exceptions if done via an extension telephone or
in the ordinary course of business.52
Most courts consider the two exceptions intricately related, and
thus, discuss them together. For example, in Briggs v. American Air
Filter Co., 5a the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that employer
monitoring of an employee conversation by an extension telephone
fell within the Title III-exceptions since the telephone was not an
intercepting device under the Act.5 Thus, the manager's activity fell

within the first exception. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held
that the manager's conduct satisfied the second exception - "in the
ordinary course of business." The court found that because the employee's phone call related to business, the manager only listened for
a period long enough to assess the nature of the phone call, and the

specific purpose for listening was business related, the manager's
conduct was "in the ordinary course of business."55
Similarly, in Epps v. St. Mary's Hospital of Athens,56 the Elev-

enth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer's use of a recording device to monitor employee phone calls was an authorized
interception. 57 The monitoring occurred during business hours and
the conversation related to business. 58 This approach suggests, that as
long as an employer intercepts or monitors an employee's communi-

cations in the ordinary course of business and for a legitimate business reason, the employer may escape liability. Employers have a
any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral or electronic
communication other than - a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, i) furnished to the subscriber or user
by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course
of business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of
its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such services and used in the ordinary course of its business.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
51. See La Crone v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 182 N.E.2d 15, 17 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931).
52. Barnett and Makar, supra note 49, at 725-26.
53. 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980) (employee brought action for invasion of privacy for
alleged wiretapping and subsequent recording of the conversation by employer/manager in
violation of the Omnibus Crimes Control and Safe Streets Act).
54. Id. at 417.
55. Id. at 420.
56. 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986) (Employees listened to other employees' telephone
conversations on a ringdown line. The court held that although the device of a ringdown line
was a wire communication, the business exception allowed the employer monitoring
activities.).
57. Id. at 414-17. The court stated: "Certainly the potential contamination of a working
environment is a matter in which the employer has a legal interest." Id. at 417.
58. Id. at 416-17.
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legitimate interest in efficiency, quality, and control of employees'
work product. 59 A fairly strong argument exists that employers' actions are legitimate when they intercept employees' E-Mail for business purposes.

An employer is also exempt from liability under ECPA when
accessing and reading stored communications."0 Because an employer is the provider of services within the corporate context, he can

easily read employee E-Mail and examine any electronic communication that circulates throughout the office.6 1 Moreover, the em-

ployer can easily circumvent any limitations that do exist. For example, a limitation exists on the disclosure of information stored in an
electronic communication system. Disclosure of the information can
occur only if "necessarily incident to the rendition of services" or to
protect "the rights or. property of the provider of the service." 62 The
employer can easily evade the limitation by asserting that private

internal business and corporate communications are, property. Because the employer needs to protect this property, he can access and
divulge such information to protect his rights."'
Within the employer/employee context, ECPA protects against
unauthorized access by other employees and by individuals outside
the enterprise organization, such as hackers and crackers. The Act

offers limited protection to communications transmitted exclusively
within the private business and between employer and employee. Because of the exceptions that exist under the Act, the employer, as
provider of the services, is virtually free to intercept, search, and

monitor employee communications.
IV.

Public Employers and the Constitutional Right to Privacy

Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act limits
coverage of an employee's right to communication privacy in the em59. See Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (1988). This section provides an exemption for: "conduct authorized I) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service; 2)
by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user." Id.
Protection under ECPA does not extend to conduct authorized in §§ 2703, 2704 and 2510 of
the Act.
61. Section 2701 of the United States Code allows the provider of services to access any
stored communications notwithstanding any "course of business" exceptions that place limitations on employers intercepting communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (1988). There is a
"course of business" exception, however, that allows an employer to divulge information obtained through access if it is "necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service." 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5)
(1988).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (1988). See also Hernandez, supra note 15, at 40.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (1988).
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ployment context, an employee may also have a constitutional right
to privacy..This section examines the employer as state actor, the
test used by the courts to assess whether the employer violated the
employee's right to privacy, and the approach courts adopt when de-

termining the reasonableness of the employer's activity.
A.

The Employer as State Actor

In the public employer/employee area, state action implicates
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution."' This principle was set
forth by the Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Ortega.65 In O'Connor, a
former chief of professional education at a state hospital brought a

claim against state hospital officials alleging that a search of his office, specifically his desk and file cabinets, violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.66 The Court used the reasoning set forth in New
Jersey v. TLO17 to reach the conclusion that searches by govern-

ment employers and supervisors of the private property of employees
are subject to Fourth Amendment constraints.68 Based upon this premise, employees enjoy an expectation of privacy in their private
property.6 9
B.

The Two Factor Katz Test
In order to invoke Fourth Amendment protections against un-

64. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714-15 (1987).
65. 480 U.S. 709 ('1987).
66. Id. at 718.
67. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In this case, an assistant vice principal searched a student's
purse after a teacher accused her of smoking in the school bathroom. After finding cigarettes
and a package of rolling paper, commonly associated with the smoking of marijuana, he proceeded to thoroughly search her purse. The vice principal found marijuana and smoking paraphernalia. Id. at 328. The student brought an action for invasion of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment, has been held to apply to conduct of government officials in civil
capacities. Id. at 334-35. The Court further stated that, "incarrying out searches and other
disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the
State, not merely as surrogate for the parents, and they cannot claim the parent's immunity
from the strictures of the fourth amendment. Id. at 336-37.
68. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 715.
69. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987). In Schowengerdt, a Navy engineer brought
invasion of privacy claims under the Fourth Amendment for a search of his locked desk and
credenza by an employee of the government acting on behalf of the employer/government.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that "[an employee] would enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas given over to his exclusive use, unless he was on notice from
his employer that searches of the type to which he was subjected might occur from time to
time for work related purposes." Id. at 1335 (footnote omitted). The court in Schowengerdt
stated that Fourth Amendment privacy interests do not turn on property interest. Thus, the
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a desk that was the property of the employer. Id. at 1333.
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reasonable searches, a government employee must show that he has
a reasonable expectation of privacy. The employee alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights must satisfy the two prong test
set forth in United States v. Katz." The first part of the test is
whether an employee has a subjective expectation of privacy." In
most instances, an employee possesses a subjective expectation of
privacy in any personal items that belong to the employee or are of
personal interest, such as his briefcase, personal mail, desk, filing
cabinet, or credenza.7
Further, most employees have a subjective expectation of privacy in their computer messages. 73 A password protects the electronic mail that an employee sends to other employees within the
company as well as those messages sent to other companies .7 An
employee who uses his personal password believes that this security
mechanism affords him the privacy of messages sent and received.
Moreover, employees sending password-protected mail messages do
not knowingly expose their communications to the public. 75 The
sender specifically addresses messages to an intended recipient. The
service places the messages in the recipient's mail file, which the recipient can access only by use of the password. Based upon this analysis, an individual's expectation of electronic mail privacy satisfies
the subjective prong of the Katz test.
The second element of the two prong Katz test, often referred to
as the objective prong, is whether society is prepared to recognize
this expectation of privacy as reasonable. 7 6 In the public employment
context, courts look at various factors to determine whether the second prong is satisfied. Three prominent factors are 1) the purpose of
the surveillance; 2) the item or area being searched; and 3) the circumstances surrounding the search.
In United States v. Kahan, 7 an Immigration and Naturalization Service employee was the subject of an INS criminal investiga70. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harland, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. See generally Schowengerdt, 823 F.2d 1328.
73. See generally John P. Furfaro and Maury B. Josephson, Electronic Monitoring of
Employees, 204 N.Y.L.J., July 6, 1990, at 3 [hereinafter Electronic Monitoring: Part I]; Electronic Monitoring: Part II,supra note 2, at 3.
74. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
75. The proposition that individuals have a subjective expectation of privacy in those
things they do not knowingly expose to the public is equally applicable to the situation where
employees believes their passwords protect the messages from public disclosure. See also
United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
76. Id. at 361.
77. 350 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affid in part & rev'd in part on other grounds,
479 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 239 (1974).
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tion. The court in Kahan looked at the purpose of the surveillance as
a factor in determining whether the employee satisfied the objective
prong of the Katz test. The court suggested that a search conducted
for business reasons lessens the expectation of privacy the employee
has in the workplace.7 8 The court recognized that government employers and supervisors have the authority to ove:rsee and inspect an
area used by an employee in order to assess the employee's job performance. 79 The court further recognized that the strictures of normal supervision in the private sector should apply in the public service context as well."0 In contrast, a government supervisor who

investigates an employee for criminal activity is no longer acting as
supervisor, but as a criminal investigator, bringing his actions under
Fourth Amendment constraints.81 The court in Kahan clearly makes
this distinction in its analysis of acceptable employer behavior.
Courts generally combine their analysis of the second and third
factors. First, property interests or rights do not mean ownership of
the property searched, but relate to a reasonable expectation of pri83
82
vacy regarding that property or interest. In Gillard v. Schmidt,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a guidance
counselor had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk from
an unwarranted invasion by a school board member.8 The court reasoned that the nature of the property interest in the searched premises does not determine applicability of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the reasonableness of one's privacy expectation is
determinative. 85 Therefore, the fact that the desk was school-owned
78. Id. at 791.
79. Id.
80. Id. The court indicated that government supervisors should effectively be able to
manage the agency under his or her control in order to evaluate performance or examine work
without undue constraints placed upon the supervisor. The court further indicated that public
employers should be able to practice normal supervising activities similar to those in the private sector. Id.
81. United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aFd in part &
rev'd in part on other grounds, 479 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S.
239 (1974).
82. Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987); see
also Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 829 (3d Cir. 1978).
83. 579 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (A school board member gained access to the counselor's suite with a janitor's passkey after school hours. The board member was in search of
the identity of the person who submitted a cartoon to the local newspaper ridiculing the financial and personnel policies of the school.).
84. Id. at 829.
85. Id. The court refused to discuss whether a public employer may invade an emThe court did state in
ployee's privacy when that invasion is work-related. See id. at 829 n.l.
the case, however, that "defendant's assertion that a public employer is free to search the
premises of an employee is a broad overstatement of the relevant law. The cases indicate that
an employer may conduct a search in accordance with a regulation or practice that would
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property did not preclude a Fourth Amendment claim. 86
Furthermore, courts have held that abandonment of property
does not necessarily preclude a Fourth Amendment claim. 87 The
court in Kahan held that the INS employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the papers he discarded in the wastebasket because he had a reasonable expectation that the papers would be destroyed. 88 The defendant relinquished possession of the property, but
did not relinquish his expectation of privacy.8 9
Courts also look to the circumstances surrounding the search of
the property interest when assessing the objective prong. In
Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp.,90 a civil service engineer
in the Navy brought an action against General Dynamics, a security
service company employed by the Navy, alleging violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights resulting from a search of his office.9 1 The
Court of Appeals held that the engineer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas under his exclusive control unless he was put
on notice by the employer that such searches may take place for
work related purposes.92
The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in O'Connor, holding
that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk
and filing cabinet.93 The Court further indicated that reasonableness
will be determined on a case-by-case basis. 9 Some government ofdispel in advance any expectations of privacy." Id. at 829.
86. Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 829 (3d Cir. 1978).
87. See generally United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784, 794-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(discussing state of the law regarding abandonment of property and citing case law), affd in
part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 479 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
415 U.S. 239 (1974).
88. Id. at 795-97.
89. Id. at 795.
90. 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987).
91. Id. at 1331.
92. Id. at 1328. From this holding it appears that an employee who has notice of office
procedures calling for inspection and examination of items such as desks, filing cabinets, and
other items of personal interest has a lessened expectation of privacy. See also United States v.
Speights, 557 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1977). In this case, a police officer was found to have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker because he was permitted to keep personal
belongings in the locker, and he took affirmative steps to secure his privacy by placing a lock
on his locker, Id. at 363. There was no regulation authorizing the search, and the department
failed to require the officer to submit a duplicate key to the department. Id.; cf. American
Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 671 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Ohio 1987)
(employees found to have no reasonable expectation of privacy because locker assignment
agreement and collective bargaining agreement put employees on notice that lockers were subject to inspection), affd, 871 F,2d 556 (6th Cir. 1989); Shaffer v. Field, 339 F. Supp. 997
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (employer had master keys to lockers so employees were held to be put on
notice of monitoring practices and thus did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy),
affd, 484 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1973).
93. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987).
94. Id.
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fices are so open to the public and fellow employees that an employee's expectation of privacy would be unreasonable under the circumstances.9 5 Thus, in assessing whether one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy, courts generally look to the property interest,
the circumstances surrounding the invasion, and general office
practices.
In an electronic mail system, the system stores messages in a file
for later retrieval. This system operates in a manner similar to when
an employee places a file in a cabinet or papers in a desk drawer for
retrieval at a later time. In comparison, the employee thinks he has
exclusive use of the mail system via the password. Electronic mail is
a form of personal mail.96 Any correspondence :is addressed specifically to an intended recipient. Most individual; hold a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their personal mail. Thus, unless an employer notifies all employees that such monitoring is taking place, the
case law seems to dictate that an invasion of an individual's E-Mail
is an invasion of privacy. It makes no difference that an employer
owns the property or provides the service.9 7
C.

The Balancing Approach

Invasion of an individual's privacy must be unreasonable in order for a Fourth Amendment claim to succeed. 9 8 The standard for
assessing reasonableness was set forth in New Jersey v. TLO.99 The
Court held that whether a search by a public employer is reasonable
depends on whether the search was justified at its inception and
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the invasion in the first place.100 Courts generally balance the employer's interests that allegedly justify the intrusion
against the nature and quality of the intrusion on the employee's
Fourth Amendment rights. 1 ' Courts, therefore, balance the interest
the employer has in supervision, efficiency and control against the
95. Id. at 718-19. See also State v. Lambright, 525 So.2d 84 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (after
employee searched by district attorney, court found that the defendant employee did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy for a bank statement left on top of desk), cert. denied, 530
So.2d 83 (La. 1988).
96. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
97. Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1228, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987).
98. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
99. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
100. Id. at 341. The Court looked to the reasonableness standard set forth in Terry v.
Ohio, which states that so long as a government agent has a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity may be present, he has the requisite authority to conduct a search. 392 U.S. I, 20-21
(1968).
101. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987).
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employee's privacy interest.10 2
Most public and private employers enter an employee's office
for work-related purposes. Most employers desire efficiency and completion of work-related projects. When employers search an employee's office or desk, they often do so for work-related purposes,
such as finding documents or important letters of correspondence.10
The Court in O'Connor held that requiring a public employer to obtain a warrant would be unduly burdensome and would disrupt nor-

mal business routines and practices.' 04 The reasonableness standard
helps to balance the parties' interests, and the Fourth Amendment
requirement operates to better serve the public.' 0 5 When balancing
such interests, it appears that a work-related search satisfies the reasonableness requirement as long as the public employer is acting in
his capacity as supervisor. 08 A public employer conducting investigatory searches in an attempt to obtain criminal evidence, however,
is not acting as a supervisor. In those instances, the employer must
have a search warrant. 0 7 This distinction is based on goals of efficiency. Based upon this standard, it appears that employers have
wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, non-investigatory reasons.' 8
The Court in O'Connor also held that a reasonableness standard
applies to investigations of work-related employee misconduct. 10 9
The government entrusts most public employers with a substantial
amount of responsibility for overseeing certain operations. The Court

reasoned that employers have a substantial interest in efficient and
effective operations and in preventing employee misconduct and mis102. Id.
103. Id. at 721-22.
104. Id. The Court stated:
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer
wished to enter an employee's office, desk or file cabinets for a work-related
purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be
unduly burdensome . . . . Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to
the primary business of the agency.
Id. at 722.
105. Id. The Court in O'Connor felt that it would be "difficult to give the concept of
probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the
purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work related purposes." Id. at 723.
106. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-22 (1987). See also United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111, 1123 (7th Cir. 1973) (work-related search by public employer found to be
reasonable where employer was surveilling employee to assess work-product).
107. See generally Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 479
F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 239 (1974).
108. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 723.
109. Id. at 724.
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feasance. "1 0 To require probable cause for a search of this type
11
would thwart an employer's attempt to maximize efficiency. '
Therefore, when determining whether work-related searches are un-.

reasonable, employers enjoy great latitude, regardless of whether one
is conducting the search for work-related misconduct or general
work-related non-investigatory reasons.
Cases such as National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab"2' and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Ass'n"3 exemplify
the substantial weight given to governmental interest in workplace
conduct. In both cases the public employer, requiring mandatory
drug and alcohol tests by all employees, satisfied the reasonableness
test." 4 In these particular instances, the substantial and compelling

governmental interest in safeguarding public safety outweighed the
privacy expectation of governmental employees against intrusion occasioned by urine testing. 1 5
D. Application to Electronic Mail-The Balancing Analysis

When examining the reasonableness of E-Mail interception,
courts must balance the interests of the employer against the employee's privacy interests." 6 An employee enjoys a legitimate privacy
interest in those items which belong to him, are exclusively used by
him, or are of a nature that the employee has a reasonable expecta10. Id.
I 11. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987). The Court stated that when balanced against the substantial governmental interest in efficient operations, an employee's privacy in the workplace is far less than any privacy interest found at home. Additionally, the
Court stated that "the employee may avoid exposing personal belongings at work by simply
leaving them at home." Id. at 725.
112. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
113. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
114. In Skinner, the Federal Railroad Administration required all railroad employees to
submit to drug and alcohol testing, Id. at 608-1I. The Court held such test to be reasonable in
light of such compelling governmental interests. Id. at 602. Similarly, in Von Raab, the United
States Custom Service required employees who applied for promotions involving interdiction of
illegal drugs to submit to drug and alcohol tests. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660. The Court held
such tests to be reasonable in light of the compelling governmental interest in preventing risks
to the lives of citizens by a person suffering from impaired perception. Id. at 679. See also
Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (urinalysis tests administered to
government employees engaged in hazardous work found reasonable); City of Annapolis v.
United Food & Commercial Workers, 565 A.2d 672 (Md. 1989) (city's mandatory drug testing found only minimally intrusive when determining whether program was valid under Fourth
Amendment constraints).
115. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; cf. Taylor v. O'Grady, 888
F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that the government interest in the integrity of the workplace was not sufficiently strong to overcome privacy interests of government employees to
justify compulsory drug testing).
116. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987).
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tion that no one will intrude upon such privacy. 117 An employee has
a password that only he owns. The only way one employee can access another employee's mail file is with knowledge of the latter's
password. Thus, the electronic mail file that an employee uses is exclusively his. The relationship of an employee with an E-Mail file is
much like the relationship of an employee with a filing cabinet or a
file marked "personal." Similarly, it may also be said that an employee's mail file is his own property. Upon termination of the employment relationship, the employer destroys the password as well as
the mail file previously used by the employee. In determining
whether an employer's search of an employee's electronic mail is reasonable, courts must balance the employer's interest in maintaining
efficiency and control against the employee's privacy interest.1 18
When a public employer has a legitimate interest, the search is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 9 When an employer conducts a search as a result of employee misconduct, the search is a
reasonable one.' 2 0 Thus, an employer who accesses an employee's
electronic mail in order to check work product, ensure efficiency, or
control employee misconduct would satisfy Fourth Amendment constraints. It is also clear that a public employer accessing an employee's E-Mail for criminal investigatory purposes would need a
search warrant to satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements.
The law, however, is unclear regarding situations involving employer searches conducted for reasons not relating to business or
criminal activities. For instance, the employer has a clearly legitimate interest in an employee's desk for work-related purposes.'
The employer is able to open an employee's desk drawer in an effort
to find a business file or assess work product. But how far does this
legitimate interest extend? Once the employer obtains the information, can he continue to read the file that contains personal documents as well? Does the reasonableness of his search extend to an
entire letter after determining that it is personal in nature rather
than business related? Courts may draw a distinction between a
search for a legitimate business purpose and one that overreaches its
boundaries, especially if the employee is not notified of the search.
For example, in the case of employee drug testing, some courts hold
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
1987).

See supra notes 72-97 and accompanying text.
O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 720.
See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 723.
See generally Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp.; 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.
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that an employer's interest in the integrity of the public workplace is
not sufficient to overcome privacy interests of employees as a justification for compulsory drug testing. 122 For a search to be reasonable,
the employer must justify it at the inception and must conduct the
search so that it reasonably relates in scope to the circumstances
that justified the interference. 23
Thus, it is arguable that an employer exceeds his authority
when he opens a filing cabinet in search of a work-related file and
continues to search through an employee's personal files, especially if
the company policy is silent on whether an employee can keep personal files at work. Similarly, an employer who accesses an employee's E-Mail file in an attempt to read the mail for business reasons may violate the Fourth Amendment if the employer continues
to read a mail message clearly marked personatl. Under these circumstances, the impetus justifying the search at its inception no
longer reasonably relates in scope to the circumstances.
An employer who exceeds the scope of a justified search commits an unreasonable intrusion. In light of these limitations, it is unclear how far the strictures of the Fourth Amendment extend or how
far courts are willing to extend protection. What is clear, however, is
that employees do have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their electronic mail messages. Public employers should respect
this privacy interest and limit their monitoring, intercepting, and
reading of employees' electronic mail.
V.

Private Employers and the Tort Right to Privacy

Although the constitutional right to privacy may afford employees in the public sector some protection against employers reading
employees' electronic mail, coverage does not extend to private employment relationships. The common law right to privacy and individual state statutes give protection to private-sector employees., 24
This section examines the appropriate tort under which an employee
may bring a cause of action for invasion of personal E-Mail. The
section also analyzes the test and factors used to determine whether
the employee can maintain the cause of action.
122. Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
123. New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
124. The creation of the right to privacy is generally credited to a law review article
written by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren. Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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A. The Appropriate Category
Professor William Prosser divided the right to privacy into four
forms of invasion: 1) intrusion upon the seclusion of another; 2) appropriation of the other's name or likeness; 3) unreasonable publicity
given to another's private life; and 4) publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public.125 The American
judicial system has held these invasions to be actionable in the area
of tort liability. 2
If a private employer unreasonably searches an employee's electronic mail, the employee may have a cause of action in the form of
"intrusion upon the seclusion of another. 1' 2 7 Intrusion upon the seclusion of another specifically covers intentional interference with
another's private affairs.' 2 8 The cause of action does not depend on

any public disclosure or publicity.

29

In a claim for invasion of pri-

vacy of an individual's electronic mail, publicity or public disclosure
is usually not an issue. Most invasions are committed solely by the
30
employer and are not disclosed to other members of the company.

Additionally, many jurisdictions provide that an individual's privacy
interest includes the right to keep his or her affairs from becoming
known to others and to prevent others from obtaining information
through improperly intrusive means. 131
For example, the principal of intrusion upon the seclusion of another covers situations where a person eavesdrops upon the private
conversations of another by means of a wiretap or microphone. 32 In
Rhodes v. Graham,'3 3 the Kentucky Court of Appeals, holding that
eavesdropping and wiretapping constituted an invasion of privacy, in125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). Each form of invasion into
one's privacy involves interference into the secluded and private life of another. Id. cmt. b.
126. Id. cmt. c.
127. "Intrusion upon seclusion" is defined as follows: "One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
See also Electronic Monitoring: Part I(, supra note 2, at 4.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977).
129. Id.
130. See generally Electronic Monitoring: Part II, supra note 2, at 3.
131. Electronic Monitoring. Part II, supra note 2, at 4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (An invasion of privacy consists of overseeing or overhearing the
plaintiff's private affairs or "in some form of investigation or examination into his private
concerns by opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe to his wallet, examining
his private bank account.").
132. WILLIAM PROSSER AND W. PAGE KEETON. THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed.
1984).
133. 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931) (action brought against individuals who tapped into
plaintiff's line and employed a stenographer to listen to and record conversations).
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dicated that all persons had a legal right to enjoy their social and
business relations and to converse within these relationships free

from intrusion.'" In Lacrone v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 35 the
Ohio Court of Appeals held that eavesdropping Jinto one's conversations is an invasion of privacy.' 36 Similarly, in Roach v. Harper,3 7
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, holding that a right

to privacy existed with respect to eavesdropping on conversations,
stated that the right to privacy is a right that individuals should hold
inviolate.' 38
The system of electronic mail operates much like a telephone
conversation. 9 Instead of orally communicating, individuals con:
verse by a computer screen."" An electronic mail system resembles
written mail sent via the Federal Postal System, which receives protection under federal law as well as common law rights to privacy.""
An employee's right to electronic mail privacy must lie somewhere in
the area between complete coverage offered by the Federal Postal
System, limited coverage offered by ECPA, and common law protection. Thus, in determining whether the monitoring of an employee's

mail messages is an invasion of privacy, the employee may bring a
cause of action for intrusion upon the seclusion of another.
B.

The Test Under Intrusion Upon Seclusion of Another

The test for intrusion upon the seclusion of another is similar to
the Katz test used in determining a Fourth Amendment claim." 2 In
order for an employee to maintain a cause of action, the invasion
' and must be one
must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person"""
44
that society will recognize.
In assessing whether an employee has

a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts must consider several fac134. Id. at 47.
135. 182 N.E.2d 15 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (In case where telephone company tapped a
subscriber's line and intruded on her conversations without notice or authorization, the court
held that such action constituted an invasion of privacy.).
136. Id.
137. 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958) (action by a tenant against her landlord for invasion
of her right to privacy when he allegedly installed a listening device in tenant's apartment).
138. Id. at 568. The court further stated that to deny one a right to privacy "under
modern means of communication, hearing devices, photography, and other technological advancements, would effectively deny valuable rights and freedoms to an individual." Id.
139. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 5, 10-14 and accompanying text. The Federal Mail Statute is located at 18 U.S.C 1702 (1988).
142. See 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977).
144. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 132.
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tors. One factor is the business practices and normal office procedures in the employer-employee relationship. 145 A second factor is
the employer's purpose for obtaining the information. 146 A third factor is the means an employer uses in the intrusion. 14 7 Additionally,
courts must balance the private employer's interests against the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy."

The business practices and the employment relationship between the employer and employee aid in assessing whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Private employers enjoy substantial leeway in business practices. 4" Employers are free to conduct
business in such a manner that will aid in the supervision, control,
and efficient operation of the workplace. Balanced against the employer's interest is the employee's expectation of privacy.1a° Most
employees have an expectation of privacy in their lockers, 51 personal
information, 155 telephone calls, aa and personal mail. 164 Depending
145. See infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text. •
146. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 132. For example, "keeping the plaintiff under
surveillance by shadowing techniques through the use of private detectives would be actionable
when such method is used for some purposes but not others." PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 132, at 856.
147. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 132, at 856. If the means are unusual, then the
intrusion is likely to be actionable. Wiretapping and use of electronic devices are generally
considered actionable. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 132, at 856.
148. Bratt v. International Business Machines Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 358 (1st Cir. 1986)
(employee sued former employer for invasion of privacy regarding employee's medical condition); see generally Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). A former
employee brought suit against his employer alleging violation of his right to privacy under
California's Constitution, which includes a right to privacy for discharge for refusal to take a
drug test. The court noted, "While an employee sacrifices some privacy rights when he enters
the workplace, the employee's privacy expectations must be balanced against the employer's
interests." Id.
149.

Electronic Monitoring: Part I, supra note 73, at 3. Employers have always found it

necessary to monitor employees' job performance. Traditionally, individual supervisors monitored employee activities. Today, employers use electronic monitoring via telephone extension
lines, computer-based monitoring devices which allow employers to track employee speed and
camera surveillance. In most instances, the law allows such monitoring. Electronic Monitoring:
Part i, supra note 73, at 3.

150. "The [employer's] duty to refrain from intrusion into another's private affairs is not
absolute in nature, but rather is limited by those rights which arise from social conditions,
including the business relationship of parties." Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382,
384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
151. K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (Employee
brought suit against her former employer for invasion of privacy stemming from employer's
action of opening and inspecting employee's locker. The court stated that this was an invasion
of privacy.), affd per curiam, 686 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985). The court stated, "It is sufficient
that an employee ...,by having placed a lock on the locker at the employee's own expense
and with the [employer's] consent, has demonstrated a legitimate expectation to a right of.
privacy in both the locker itself and those personal effects within it." Id.
152. Bratt, 785 F.2d at 360. The court, holding that an employee had a personal privacy
interest in the information regarding his condition, stated that "the test for a violation of
privacy is whether the substantiality of the intrusion on the employee's privacy which result
from the disclosure outweighs the employer's legitimate business interest . .

.

.The more per-
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upon the business practices and the employer/employee relationship,
the activities of the employer could lessen the expectations of
privacy.
For example, in the case of monitored telephone calls, an employer who monitors phone calls in an effort to maintain quality and
control and who gives employees notice of such monitoring satisfies
the reasonable conduct requirement. 156 When balanced against the
employer's interest and the fact that the employer gave notice, the
employee's expectation of privacy is not reasonable. 6
In most instances, courts consider the means and purpose concurrently when determining whether an employer's intrusion is an
actionable invasion of privacy. For example, some courts hold that
when balancing the employer's interest in assessing an employee's
disability against an employee's expectation of privacy, the invasion
that occurs if an employer spies on the employee in the employee's
home is not actionable. 15 7 An employer's interest in an employee using illegal drugs is another area in which courts generally hold the
invasion of privacy not actionable, especially when adequate safeguards are present." 8' A private employer has a legitimate interest in
preventing drug abuse among employees that may result in decreased productivity and may detrimentally affect the health and
sonal the information disclosed, the greater the intrusion upon in individual's privacy." Id.
153. Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, 395 (W.D. Okla.
1978) (former employee of telephone company sued the company for invasion of privacy for
monitoring phone calls). The court noted that under 18 U.S.C. § 2511, a person has an expectation of privacy regarding the privacy of his or her telephone calls. Id.
154. Venars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that a stockholder of a
corporation had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his mail marked personal that was
delivered to the corporation). The court stated, "Just as private individuals have a right to
expect that their telephonic communications will not be monitored, they also have a reasonable
expectation that their personal mail will not be opened and read by unauthorized persons." Id.
at 969.
155. Simmons, 452 F. Supp. at 394.
156. Id. at 396.
157. Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). An employee brought an action against his supervisor and employer for peeping through employee's
windows in his home to assess the extent of his disability. The court, holding that the employer
had a legitimate business interest, reasoned that when balanced against the privacy interest of
the employee, the scales were in favor of the employer. Id. at .384. The court stated that the
"[plaintiff's privacy was subject to the legitimate interest of his employer in investigating
suspicions that plaintiff's work-related disability was a pretext. Id. See also Bratt v. International Business Machines Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 360 (1st Cir. 1916) (employer had a legitimate
business interest in employee's mental condition).
158. Ludtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1:,23
(Alaska 1989). The public
policy of protecting health and safety of other workers overrides the public policy of employees' right to privacy. However, limitations exist on employer drug testing. Employers must give
adequate notice, administer the test at a reasonable time, and conduct the test by the least
intrusive means. Id. at 1136.
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safety of all employees. 159 When courts balance this interest against
an "at-will" employee's expectation of privacy, they usually hold the
invasion not actionable. 6 ' Thus, so long as the employer uses the

least intrusive means available, has a legitimate interest in obtaining
the information or monitoring the employee, and gives notice to the
employee of such monitoring, the employee cannot assert an invasion
of privacy action. Courts tips the scales in favor of the employer.

When balancing the interests of the private employer/employee
relationship with respect to electronic mail, employees are found to

have a legitimate, reasonable expectation of privacy. 161 Because intrusion into the seclusion of another covers invasion into one's mail,
wiretapping, or eavesdropping into an individual's conversations, an
employee can maintain a cause of action for intrusion into one's electronic mail. 6 ' In the employer/employee context, however, when
balancing a private employer's business interest against this expectation of privacy of an employee's communications, the employer wins.
C. Limitations on Employer Monitoring Activities
The extent of employer monitoring has limitations. An individ-

ual can bring a cause of action for invasion of privacy under a Title
III violation of the Omnibus Crimes and Control Act. By examining
the case law under the Act, an individual can see the courts' tendency to limit employer activities under certain circumstances. In
Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 6 s the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-

peals held that an employer's monitoring of an employee's personal
call during lunch hour was not within the ordinary course of busi-

ness."6 The court stated that an employer may intercept a personal
call to the extent necessary to determine whether the call is personal

or business, but further interception is not within the ordinary course
159. Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989) (employee asserted the claim that mandatory drug testing, which her employer required,
was an invasion of her privacy).
160. Id. at 499. The court held that the employer's program did not violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy when balanced against the employer's legitimate interest in health and
safety. Id. The court further noted that employment on an "at will" basis is one that mutually
exists, for either party can end the relationship at their discretion without cause. Id. As a
result of this relationship, when the employer notifies an employee of a change in employment
conditions, the employee either has a choice to accept the new terms or quit. Id.
161. See supra notes 70-123 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 70-123 and accompanying text.
163. 704 F.2d 577 (1lth Cir. 1983) (plaintiff, employed as a sales representative for
defendant company which monitored phone calls to assess employee work-product, made a
personal call during lunch hour regarding a job interview, and the employer monitored the
call).
164. Id. at 583-84.
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of business.' Therefore, an individual may draw the conclusion that
employers lack authority to monitor personal calls beyond the extent
necessary to determine their nature. 16' Similarly, in Briggs, the court
of appeals specifically declined to decide whether Title III authorizes
employer monitoring of personal calls.167 In light of this limitation
on monitoring, if an employer searches an employee's locker or desk
or intercepts or monitors a personal phone call of an employee without prior consent or notification, the employee can maintain a cause
of action.
Under this invasion of privacy analysis, an employer is justified
in monitoring an employee's E-Mail to the extent necessary to determine if the messages are business related. However, in a situation
where the employer reads such messages to gain more information
about an employee's private life beyond the extent necessary for business purposes, the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy is
stronger than the employer's interest. If a mail message appears to
be personal in nature, and absent any notice to the employee of monitoring practices or normal business relations explicitly prohibiting
personal use of employer's equipment, an employer can only intercept or read messages to determine whether they are business or personal in nature. Employers who are unhappy with employee personal
use may either fire or give notice to employees that such practices
are unacceptable. In most instances, however, employees are unaware of such monitoring and thus never realize that an invasion of
their privacy has occurred. Therefore, in order to protect this privacy
interest, employers, out of fairness to employees, should be required
to give notice of monitoring practices.
VI.

Remedy for the Future

Statutory, constitutional, or common law privacy rights offer
limited protection in the area of personal electronic mail. The EPCA
contains many loopholes that allow an employer great leeway when
165. Id. at 583.
166. Barnett and Makar, supra note 49, at 733.
167. Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 414, 420 (lst Cir. 1986). In a
footnote the majority indicated the difficulty in applying Title II exceptions to personal telephone calls. Id. at 420 n.8. See Oliver v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 632 P.2d 1295
(Or. Ct. App. 1981). The court stated that "absent any conflict in the facts as to whether
plaintiff's telephone conversations were intruded upon, it is not necessary to determine whether
any eavesdropping was upon personal or business matters." Id. at 1299. From this, an individual may infer that there is a distinction between personal and business use of the telephone by
an employee and a limitation on employer monitoring in the case of personal use by the
employee.
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conducting his business operations. The tort for intrusion upon the
seclusion of another and the constitutional right to privacy offer limited protection in the age of new advanced technology. Courts have
not yet extended traditional notions of the right to privacy into the
area of electronic mail. Because state statutes and constitutions determine the common law right to privacy, there are no real standards
or guidelines that employers and employees can use when determining the legal limits of their rights. There is, however, still a remedy
to the wrong.
In many instances, employers extend their right to monitor employee activity for efficiency, control, and quality work product to an
extreme. Employers do not limit themselves to intercepting or reading employees' computer mail. With such advanced technology, employers are instituting monitoring devices that assess the quantity of
key stroke activity, the number of errors or corrections an employee
makes while typing, the speed of work, and the time an employee is
away from the job. 16 8 Employers evaluate an estimated ten million
workers by computers.1" 9 Through the use of computers, employers
can send subliminal messages to employees encouraging them to
work faster or concentrate harder.1 70 Additionally, employers use au1
dio and visual surveillance to monitor employee activity."
Employers' reading of employees' electronic mail as a method of
monitoring activity, as well as ,their use of other monitoring methods,
has sparked a need to expand constitutional and common law rights
to privacy and to implement employment privacy laws. Dean Prosser, when categorizing the different manifestations of the right to
privacy, indicated that courts should not construe these categories so
as to "exclude the possibility of future developments in the tort law
of privacy." 172 Thus, courts should expand the tort of intrusion into
the seclusion of another to include employer violations of electronic
mail and should place limitations on the extent of employer intrusions into areas of employee privacy.
Senator Paul Simon, D-Ill., has introduced a bill designed to
168. Gary T. Marx, The Case of the Omniscient Organization, 68 HARV. Bus. REV. 12,
14 (1990).
169. 9 to 5 Report, supra note 3, at 1.
170. Gary T. Marx and Sanford Sherizen, Monitoring on the Job: How To Protect Privacy As Well As Property, 89 TECH. REV. 63, 66 (1986) (discussing the privacy implications
of monitoring in the workplace in light of the new technological age). See also Marx, supra
note 168, at 14.
171. Marx, supra note 168, at 14.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. c (1977).
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prevent potential abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace.17
The bill amends Title III to provide employees with greater protection.174 Out of fairness to the employee, the bill requires an employer
to give notice to employees regarding monitoring practices.1 7 The
bill also requires employers to give notice to employees when the em-

ployer monitors employee activity. 76 Notification should be provided
through such devices as signal lights, beeper tones, or verbal notification.177 One of the effects of the notice requirement is to undermine
78
the business extension exemption.
Electronic mail monitoring is one of the areas covered by the
bill. The bill covers "electronic observation and supervision, remote

telephone surveillance, telephone call accounting, or other forms of
visual, auditory or computer based surveillance

. . .

transmitted by a

wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo-electronic or photo-optical system. ' 7 9 Thus, by the very definition, the bill includes electronic
communications such as E-Mail. 80
This bill, if passed, would expand privacy rights in all sectors of
employment. The bill operates to more clearly define employer-employee legal relations. Because most employees are in an "at-will"''
employment relationship, the employee must adhere to the employer's terms. Because of the inequality in the employment relationship, it is only fair that employers give notice of monitoring prac173. S. 2164, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Senator Simon indicated in his introduction
of the bill into the Senate that employees have a right to privacy, and with the vast number of
employers engaging in such monitoring practices, offices have become electronic sweatshops.
136 CONG. REC. 14 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1990). Due to employers' efforts to monitor actions for
efficiency and control, a higher level of stress in the workplace results. 9 to 5 Report, supra
note 3, at 4. In a survey conducted by Massachusetts Coalition on New Office Technology of
700 employees from 49 companies, 81% of the respondents said that monitoring makes the job
more stressful. 9 to 5 Report, supra note 3, at I1.Furthermore, st,'ess-related diseases such as
ulcers, heart disease, fatigue, diabetes, and depression have become the most common occupational illnesses of worker's under age 40. Marx, supra note 168, -t 30.
174. Electronic Monitoring: Part 1, supra note 73, at 32.
175. S. 2164, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1990). "[E]mploycr who engages in electronic
monitoring shall provide the affected employee with a signal light, beeping tone, verbal notification, or other form of visual or aural notice, at periodic intervals, that indicate electronic
monitoring is taking place." Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. Additionally, the bill, in an effort to protect one's privacy, requires that "[an
employer shall not collect personal data on an employee through electronic monitoring which is
not relevant to the employer's work performance." Id. at § 5.
178. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
179. S. 2164, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990).
180. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
181. "At will" in the employment context is defined as "the employment contract continues between [two parties] at their mutual pleasure and either may put an end to it at any
time without cause." Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1989).
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tices. In the case of electronic mail, employers can protect
themselves by displaying on the terminal screen a notice that the
information stored is accessible by the employer, and that the employer reserves the right to read and monitor messages sent via electronic mail. 182 An alternative is for the employer to ensure complete
privacy protection from unwarranted intrusion. This alternative improves working relations. In the new technological age, privacy laws
need to be updated. By expanding privacy protections to include
electronic mail in the private and public employment sector, concerned parties can accomplish that goal.
VII. Conclusion
The privacy concerns over employers reading employees' electronic mail is rapidly becoming a new legal area. While some case
law exists on monitoring in general, there is no case law on the right
to privacy of one's electronic mail in the private or public employment context. It is mostly speculation at this point as to which way
courts will rule when presented with this issue: Should employers
have free access to employees' computer mail files and be able to
read their personal messages? Case law analysis suggests that this is
an allowable action within certain limitations. Our judicial system
insures fairness to all individuals and insures that others do not
abridge those rights. Clearly, employees do enjoy an expectation of
privacy in their mail. Employers also maintain legitimate business
interests in overseeing operations and in working to further a goal of
efficiency and excellence. These interests, when balanced against
each other, appear from the analogous case law to weigh in favor of
the employer. In the typical employment relationship, the employee
does not have much bargaining power. Employees must take the employment conditions regarding monitoring practices as they find
them. In light of this fact, is it not fair to give some privacy protection against such invasion? Courts, Congress and employers should
extend privacy laws to afford employees protection in the area of
electronic mail monitoring.
Lois R. Witt

182. Ruel Torres Hernandez, Computer Electronic Mail and Privacy, 3
& SEC. REP. 4, 7-8 (1984).
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